Suchergebnisse

The outcomes of international negotiations cannot be understood without considering how participants behave strategically. But how do "rules of the game" in negotiations - and the uncertainty that often surrounds them - shape this behavior? I examine the 2002-2007 period of the negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the European Union and West Africa. I argue that both sides made misguided strategic choices. Their misperceptions of the rules operative in trade negotiations with a "development dimension" facilitated the emergence of an impasse during the 2002–2007 negotiating period of the EPA process. In order to explain why, we should conceive of bargaining processes as spaces defined by unstable and potentially contested rules. I offer three mechanisms - payoff disjuncture, choice-range disjuncture, and style disjuncture - that help account for how misperceptions of these socially constructed rules can prevent, or at least delay, cooperation. My approach complements rationalist theories that rely on the insights of game theory with a constructivist perspective that brings to light the socially constructed nature of negotiation processes.

Die Autorin geht der Frage nach, inwiefern die im Jahr 2000 verabschiedete UN-Resolution 1325 zu "Frauen, Frieden und Sicherheit" zur erfolgreichen Integration einer Gender-Perspektive in die Arbeit des UN-Sicherheitsrates geführt hat. Sie stellt zunächst die Bedeutung von Gender-Fragen im Kontext der internationalen Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik in den Vereinten Nationen dar und skizziert die Entstehungsgeschichte der Resolution 1325. Sie geht anschließend näher auf den Inhalt und die Auslegung der Resolution ein und überprüft die Verbindlichkeit ihrer rechtlichen Bestimmungen in Bezug auf die Partizipation von Frauen, die Berücksichtigung von Gender-Perspektiven bei Peacekeeping-Missionen, den Schutz von Frauen und Mädchen sowie die Umsetzung des Leitbildes Gender Mainstreaming in UN-Berichten. Sie stellt dabei eine feministische Methode zur Rechtsanalyse vor und beleuchtet auf dieser Grundlage die UN-internen Maßnahmen zur Implementierung der Resolution 1325 in der Praxis. Ihr Beitrag schließt mit einer Erörterung der Frage, wie in Zukunft die Integration einer Gender-Perspektive in internationalen Organisationen gestärkt werden kann. (ICI)

The language of world trade politics : introduction / Klaus Dingwerth and Clara Weinhardt -- Trade / Matthew Eagleton-Pierce -- Protectionism / Gary Winslett -- Foreign direct investment / Lukas Linsi -- Multilateralism / Matthew Bishop and Valbona Muzaka -- Democracy / Klaus Dingwerth -- Civil society / Michael Strange -- Coherence / Felix Anderl -- Development / Angela Geck and Clara Weinhardt -- Environment / Emily Lydgate -- Justice / Clara Brandi

Abstract
The geopolitical rise of emerging economies has led to contestations and renegotiations of the boundaries of the developing country status. Established powers put pressure on emerging economies to give up this status and the benefits it comes with in global regimes. In this article, we analyse the (re)negotiation of China's developing country status within the context of US–China geoeconomic competition with respect to two core areas in the global economy—finance and trade. We show that whether private or public actors are responsible for status classification influences the outcomes of contestation over China's status. When private sector actors are central, China is more likely able to defend its developing country status against US pressure. We also find that these processes are mitigated by how decision-making processes are institutionalised. Our two case studies thus illustrate that regulatory processes such as status classification influence the outcomes of geoeconomic competition in international politics. These findings also shed new light on the power of states versus non-state actors within global governance amidst the geoeconomic turn: the public–private divide can serve as an important context factor that influences the probability of the international economic order to cater more towards US or Chinese geoeconomic strategies.

Abstract
The global power shift towards Brazil, India, China and other non-western powers has led to pressures to adjust international institutions to new economic realities. Most power shift theories assume that established powers defend their institutional privileges, while emerging powers challenge them. Conversely, in this article we reverse this assumption by shedding light on 'privileges' of the weak: many international institutions have established special rights for disadvantaged regime members. We ask what strategies emerging powers adopt as they come under pressure to give up these rights commonly reserved for regime members with developing country status. We present a novel conceptualization of four ideal-typical strategies that combine elements of resistance and accommodation. Empirically, we examine the strategies that Brazil, India and China (BICs) have adopted in the World Trade Organization. We find that no uniform approach exists across the BICs: while India fiercely resists giving up its status as a developing country and the flexibilities it comes with, Brazil adopts a pragmatic approach that largely accommodates established powers' demands to give up special rights reserved for developing countries. China pursues a mixed strategy of selective accommodation and resistance. These findings contribute to recent debates on global power shifts by illustrating how material incentives and status considerations shape the adaptation of international institutions as privileges for the weak are re-negotiated.

This article examines the implications of the rise of new powers in the Global South for a central principle of global order: the distinction between the 'North' and the 'South', or 'developed' and 'developing countries', that emerged in the second half of the twentieth century. In doing so, we assess whether, and if so, how, the increasing tension between the binary 'North-South' distinction and growing heterogeneity within the Global South - as evidenced by the rise of emerging economies - has been reflected in the rules of multilateral trade policymaking. In the case of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 'North-South' categorisation forms the basis of the legal principle of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) that grants special rights to developing countries. To trace the evolution of SDT, we analyse legal developments and processes of contestation based on our conceptualisation of possible options for adaptation: graduation, individualisation and fragmentation. Drawing on a dataset of WTO decisions and agreements from 1995 to 2019, we find that the group of developing countries increasingly competes with other groups of disadvantaged countries for equity-based differential treatment. The resulting fragmentation contributes to the unmaking of the North-South distinction as a central ordering principle in global trade politics.

This essay revisits the developed/developing country division in the global economy in the light of the economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic. A trend that precedes the pandemic has been a seeming detachment of the binary distinction between "developed" versus "developing" countries and what has been described as growing economic diversity in the so-called "developing world." While emerging markets such as Brazil, India, or China have been able to catch up economically with the "developed" world, many African, Middle Eastern, or South Asian countries are increasingly marginalized in the global economy. At the same time, there is an increasing recognition that poverty is rising within the so-called "developed" world. Against this context, we investigate whether the economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic reinforce this trend and further blur the developed/developing country divide in the global economy. We find a nuanced picture that contains elements of both continuity and change: while the short-term implications of the COVID-19 pandemic cut across the developed/developing country distinction, its long-term economic repercussions largely reiterate the divide—with the exception of China among the emerging markets.

The politicisation of recent European Union (EU) trade negotiations such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership or the Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement suggests that the more negotiations focus on deep integration issues, the higher the potential for polarization of values and interests. Yet, as we argue, this pattern does not necessarily hold true in EU trade negotiations with the developing world. In the case of the Economic Partnership Agreements with West Africa and the Caribbean region, the pattern of politicisation was 'reversed': Politicisation remained low in the Caribbean region, despite the inclusion of deep integration issues. To the contrary, negotiations became highly politicised in West Africa, where negotiations focussed on the traditional realm of trade in goods. Combining the insights from the literature on the role of non-state actors (NSAs) in trade policy-making in developing countries and on politicisation, we show that limited pre-existing mobilisation resources of NSAs, and few opportunities to engage with the political level of negotiations, imply that those affected by the inclusion of deep integration issues hardly mobilise. We also find that lack of technical expertise and the significance of traditional trade areas pre-empts NSAs from engaging in emotive framing on deep integration issues. This helps us to unpack the different patterns of politicisation across both regions: Politicisation in West Africa was facilitated by civil society actors who—in contrast to the Caribbean region—could draw on pre-existing networks, expertise, and direct access to the regional negotiation level.

The politicisation of recent European Union (EU) trade negotiations such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership or the Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement suggests that the more negotiations focus on deep integration issues, the higher the potential for polarization of values and interests. Yet, as we argue, this pattern does not necessarily hold true in EU trade negotiations with the developing world. In the case of the Economic Partnership Agreements with West Africa and the Caribbean region, the pattern of politicisation was 'reversed': Politicisation remained low in the Caribbean region, despite the inclusion of deep integration issues. To the contrary, negotiations became highly politicised in West Africa, where negotiations focussed on the traditional realm of trade in goods. Combining the insights from the literature on the role of non-state actors (NSAs) in trade policy-making in developing countries and on politicisation, we show that limited pre-existing mobilisation resources of NSAs, and few opportunities to engage with the political level of negotiations, imply that those affected by the inclusion of deep integration issues hardly mobilise. We also find that lack of technical expertise and the significance of traditional trade areas pre-empts NSAs from engaging in emotive framing on deep integration issues. This helps us to unpack the different patterns of politicisation across both regions: Politicisation in West Africa was facilitated by civil society actors who—in contrast to the Caribbean region—could draw on pre-existing networks, expertise, and direct access to the regional negotiation level.